The High Court has dismissed the liquidators’ appeal in Webb & another (as joint liquidators of Eversholt Rail (365) Ltd (in liquidation) v another company [2026] EWHC 101 (Ch), reaffirming that requests for information under section 235 and 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 must be reasonable.

Sections 235 and 236 enable officeholders to uncover the true facts of the company’s business and dealings by empowering the court to compel both individuals who have acted for or been employed by the company (section 235) and third parties (section 236) to provide company documentation and information.

The appeal arises from the liquidation of Eversholt Rail (365) Ltd (“Eversholt”). On appointment, the liquidators were faced with a company with no employees and virtually no documentation, as Eversholt relied on services provided by its sister company, Eversholt Rail Ltd (“ERL”), under a well-established service agreement.

As such the liquidators sought an order pursuant to section 236 requiring ERL and ERL’s solicitors to deliver “copies of all documents…. relating to the business, dealings, affairs or property” of Eversholt. This request was referred to by court as an ‘everything forever’ request, reflecting its breadth and lack of defined limits as to category, time period or purpose.

The application was dismissed at first instance. Judge Burton held that sections 235 and 236 require applicants to show the request is reasonably required and therefore dismissed the broad request because it was unjustified and unnecessary. 

On appeal, the liquidators advanced 10 grounds of appeal, but their case ultimately rested on two core propositions:

  • that the purpose of section 236 is to give liquidators access to all information needed to reconstitute the company’s state of knowledge; or,
  • alternatively, that an everything forever request, without any additional justifications, was reasonable in the circumstances, where virtually all documentation is held by a third party.

The appeal was dismissed.

Reconstitution of Corporate Knowledge

Whilst the court accepted that reconstituting corporate knowledge is a legitimate purpose of a section 236 application, it does not operate as a standalone justification and does not displace the requirement that the request must be reasonable.

Section 235 expressly limits disclosure to such information “as the office holder may … reasonably require”. The court reaffirmed that this standard extends to section 236 – a position established by several authorities, including Re British & Commonwealth Holdings plc, Green v BDO Stoy Hayward and Re Corporate Jet Realisations Ltd. Extending the reasonable requirement threshold to section 236 follows logic given that section 236 applies to third parties and can therefore impose a wider and more onerous burden than section 235.

The liquidators argued that applying a reasonable requirement would incentivise corporate groups to structure themselves in similar ways to avoid disclosure. The court rejected this submission. In doing so, the judge endorsed the first-instance finding that the application had been brought on a misconceived basis. Importantly, the court stressed that this does not mean applications in similar circumstances must fail; rather, it highlights that such applications must be properly justified and appropriately scoped. There may, therefore, be circumstances where an ‘everything forever’ request is reasonable.

Reasonableness of the request

The liquidators argued in the alternative that, because they had no meaningful information about the company’s business and affairs on appointment, an ‘everything forever’ request was reasonable.

The court rejected this, holding that this argument was inconsistent with both the established authorities and the express wording of the statute. Stating that a lack of initial knowledge does not entitle an office-holder to bypass the statutory requirement of reasonableness by resorting to a blanket request.

One of the appeal grounds advanced in support of the liquidators’ position was that pursuant to the service agreement between Eversholt and ERL. ERL was obliged to keep records of all material matters and make them available on request. Whilst the court accepted that contractual arrangements may contribute to establishing a reasonable requirement, the liquidators had sought all documents relating to the company’s affairs, which was far wider than ERL’s contractual obligation to provide material documents. This therefore did not remove the need to justify the scope of the request.

Key Takeaways

  • Section 236 is a powerful tool but not unlimited

Liquidators must demonstrate that the information sought is reasonably required, even where they have little to no knowledge on the company’s affairs

  • Reconstituting corporate knowledge is a legitimate purpose, not a standalone justification

Reconstituting corporate knowledge may support a request but it does not remove the need to justify the reasonableness of the request

  • A broad request may be reasonable in appropriate circumstances

The liquidators will need to be able to demonstrate that the categories of documents sought are reasonably required and that the burden imposed on the parties holding the documents is proportionate

  • Office-holders should carefully define the scope of any section 236 request

To demonstrate a reasonable requirement, office-holders should consider how the scope can be defined by type, time, purpose, parties and why those documents are required.