The recent High Court decision in Maher and another v Investalet Ltd [2025] EWHC 3133 (Ch) serves as a critical reminder for insolvency practitioners about the importance of choosing the correct procedural route when seeking possession of property. It is an important case for insolvency practitioners dealing with intermediate landlords and unauthorised occupiers.
In this case, the court held that section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA 1986”) cannot be used to force trespassers to give up possession of a property. This is because a trespasser’s possessory title is not the type of property that can be paid, delivered, conveyed, surrendered or transferred under section 234 IA 1986.
Sections 235 and 236 enable officeholders to uncover the true facts of the company’s business and dealings by empowering the court to compel both individuals who have acted for or been employed by the company (section 235) and third parties (section 236) to provide company documentation and information.
The appeal arises from the liquidation of Eversholt Rail (365) Ltd (“Eversholt”). On appointment, the liquidators were faced with a company with no employees and virtually no documentation, as Eversholt relied on services provided by its sister company, Eversholt Rail Ltd (“ERL”), under a well-established service agreement.
As such the liquidators sought an order pursuant to section 236 requiring ERL and ERL’s solicitors to deliver “copies of all documents…. relating to the business, dealings, affairs or property” of Eversholt. This request was referred to by court as an ‘everything forever’ request, reflecting its breadth and lack of defined limits as to category, time period or purpose.
The application was dismissed at first instance. Judge Burton held that sections 235 and 236 require applicants to show the request is reasonably required and therefore dismissed the broad request because it was unjustified and unnecessary.
On appeal, the liquidators advanced 10 grounds of appeal, but their case ultimately rested on two core propositions:
that the purpose of section 236 is to give liquidators access to all information needed to reconstitute the company’s state of knowledge; or,
alternatively, that an everything forever request, without any additional justifications, was reasonable in the circumstances, where virtually all documentation is held by a third party.
The recent decision in CDI Realisations Limited is a short one, but it sits against a much longer-running debate about creditor consent for administration extensions and, in particular, when creditor status should be assessed for these purposes.
While the facts of CDI are relatively straightforward, the decision is a useful addition to the growing body of authority and guidance that points towards a pragmatic, interest-based approach to consent under Schedule B1.
When a business runs into financial difficulties and proposes a Company Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”), landlords, insolvency practitioners and local authorities can disagree about who should pick up the bill for business rates on empty leasehold premises – the landlord, or the company in CVA?
When a company enters administration, the administrators must set out proposals explaining how they intend to achieve the purpose of the administration, but what happens when creditors refuse to approve those proposals? A recent decision in Re PPE Medpro Limited (in Administration) [2025] EWHC 3449 (Ch) (“PPE Medpro”) provides important clarification.
The Statutory Framework
Paragraph 49(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA86”) requires an administrator to produce proposals explaining how the relevant statutory purpose of the administration is to be achieved. Those proposals must be put to creditors for approval.
Where creditors fail to approve the proposals or a revision of the proposals, paragraph 55 of Schedule B1 to the IA86 provides that, upon the administrator reporting the outcome to the court, the court may:
provide that the appointment of an administrator shall cease to have effect from a specified time;
adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally;
make an interim order;
make an order on a petition for winding up suspended by virtue of paragraph 40(1)(b); or
make any other order that the court thinks appropriate.
Are administrators required to apply for court directions where a proposal is rejected?
In a world where it is much more common to send someone a text, a WhatsApp message, email or other electronic communication, than type a letter or put pen to paper, the Court does find itself now and again considering how the digital ways of communicating interact with laws that were introduced way before the concept of sending someone an instant message were even contemplated.
Although the case of Reid-Roberts v Mei-Lin [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch) considered WhatsApp messages in the context of personal insolvency, the decision is of wider interest to insolvency practitioners (IPs) as a reminder that more casual ways of communicating could have legal consequences – both for them and when considering the asset position on an insolvency.
Following our previous blog Revolution Bars: When is a meeting really a meeting?” Mr Justice Hildyard has, in Re Argo Blockchain Plc[1], affirmed the position that a creditor can only approve a restructuring plan (“RP”) if at least 75% in value of a class of creditors, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting, vote in favour. A single chairman holding proxies for two or more creditors does not constitute a valid meeting for the purpose of approving a RP and, irrespective of the proxy vote, the class will be treated as dissenting.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT)[1] upheld an employment tribunal’s decision that the claimant, Mr Chaudhry, could not recover a basic award for unfair dismissal following their employer’s insolvency unless an employment tribunal had determined the claim and made an award.
Why is this relevant to administrators? Because for an employee to bring a claim the administrator must give permission for the employee to bring or continue such a claim given the existence of the moratorium. The question this decision helps clarify, is whether administrators should do as a matter of course. It also helps clarify, that for employees, they need the employment tribunal to determine a claim for unfair dismissal in order to make any recoveries following the employer company entering administration.
Despite meeting statutory jurisdictional requirements under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006, the High Court declined to exercise its discretion in favour of sanctioning Waldorf Production UK Plc’s restructuring plan in August 2025due to concerns about fair allocation of value and lack of meaningful engagement with unsecured creditors.
Waldorf then sought and was granted permission to “leapfrog” its appeal directly to the Supreme Court. The progress of this appeal was being closely tracked by industry professionals as it offered the possibility of Supreme Court clarification around how the issue of fairness should be approached. However, restructuring professionals are destined for disappointment on this front, with news now out that Waldorf has withdrawn its appeal. This means that the Court of Appeal’s trilogy of cases—Adler, Petrofac, and Thames Water—now stand as the definitive authority on fairness in restructuring plans.
So how do plan companies approach the question of fairness and the fair allocation of the benefits generated by the plan? The principles that apply are these:
